The Euthyphro Dialogue free essay sample

In this paper I will describe and analyze the Euthyphro dialogue where Plato offered an argument against the divine command Meta- ethical view. In this dialogue, Socrates argued against Euthyphro definition of actions being pious and holy. In Plato’s Euthyphro, Socrates first heard that Euthyphro is trying to prosecute his father for murder. Euthyphro’s thinks that his action was pious, and his definition of piety is doing what the God(s) approve of. Socrates questioned Euthyphro’s definition of action being pious and quickly asks: â€Å"is the holy loved by the gods because it is holy? Or is it holy because it is loved? Socrates presents this premise to argue against Euthyphro definition of piety as he suggests this question. What Socrates has asked is whether something is lovable because the God (s) love it, or the God(s) love it for the reason that something is loveable. He points out this question because it introduces the Euthyphro dilemma. We will write a custom essay sample on The Euthyphro Dialogue or any similar topic specifically for you Do Not WasteYour Time HIRE WRITER Only 13.90 / page This dilemma obstructs Socrates to draw the conclusion of what pious and holiness is. Socrates suggests that there are two horns in the Euthyphro dilemma. The first horn that he illustrates is the question of whether moral is loved by the God(s) because it is moral. Socrates points out that if an action is holy then the God (s) will love it. And no matter how the God(s) feels about it, or whether if the God(s) will approve or disprove it, and that action will still be holy. For instance, we all know that rape is impious. No matter how the God (s) think, he cannot change the fact that rape is impious. What this horn implies is that morality is independent of the God(s)’s opinion, and therefore the God(s)’s opinion is bounded by the morality. Following the first horn in the Euthyphro dilemma, Socrates introduces the second horn in the dilemma. As he again asks: â€Å"is the holy loved by the gods because it is holy? Or is it holy because it is loved? † Socrates addresses that the second horn is that the God(s)’s opinion or approval of a certain action makes that particular action pious. In other words, morality is bounded by the God(s)’s opinion. This second horn is also known as the Divine Command Theory. In this theory it claims that the God(s) is goodness. In order for us to judge whether an action is moral or immoral is solely based on whether the God(s) allows us to do it, or prohibits us from doing it. In contrast, the second horn is rather the opposite of the first horn. The first horn states that morality is independent of the God(s)’s opinion, and the God(s)’s opinion is bounded by the morality. Whereas, the second horn states that morality is depending and is bounded by the God(s)’s opinion or approval. The use of the Euthyphro Dilemma by Socrates to argue against Euthyphro’s definition of pious is relatively successful. Here are the analyses of how successful the two horns are in the Dilemma. Suppose the first horn: â€Å"is the pious loved by the god(s) because it is pious† is true, then we can conclude that the God(s) bases his decision what to love on what is already pious. As a result, piety must have existed before any of the God(s)’s love. Otherwise, the God(s) will not love anything since there isn’t any piety. If it is true that piety exists before any love, then it means that piety is independent of the God(s)’s love. And therefore piety is not affected or determined by the God(s). In other words, no matter whether the God(s) loves an action or not, piety still exists on the action. On the other hand, let us assume that the second horn that Socrates presented: â€Å"Is it holy because it is loved? † is true. Then in this point of view, nothing is good until the God(s) loves it. Suppose then, that the second horn: â€Å"It is holy because it is loved† is correct, then on this view, nothing is pious until the God(s) loves it. However, if this is true, then it raises three problems. The first problem is known as the problem of arbitrariness. It comes to this first problem when the God(s) chooses which action to love and to hate. And what the God(s) loves or approves of is based on some property of an action. In other words, the property of the action is what really makes the action pious, not the God(s)’s love or approval. As a result, in order for the God(s) to really make an action pious, the God(s) will have to love and approves the action(s) arbitrarily, with no reason at all. This problem is made worse when if it is true that the omnipotent God can love and approve of anything arbitrarily. For example, if the God(s) approves and loves assassinations or murders, then the action of assassinating and murder will automatically become pious. This doesn’t seem right though that even if the God(s) loves murders and killings and theses actions will still be pious. And therefore, this problem proves the Devine command theory to be false. The problem of caprice is the second problem that exists in the second horn from the dilemma. This problem suggests that the God(s)’s approval and his love for an action might be pious for today, but it might be impious tomorrow. In addition, Socrates explains that if there are many gods, how can things be determined if they are pious or not. â€Å"It would be at all surprising if you were thereby doing something agreeable to Zenus but odious to Coronus and Uranus. This second problem creates a grey area of whether an action is pious or not. Due to the fact that this grey-area exists, it implies that the Devine Command Theory can be false. The third problem that exists in the dilemma is the problem of triviality. We all know that â€Å"God is good† and â€Å"Whatever God does is good†. However, it is no triviality that the God(s) should act in accordance with these values. There is a possi bility that one day at which the God(s) fails to act â€Å"good†, and which it also means that there is a possibility that the Divine Command Theory can become false. By now, we have described and analyzed the two horns in the dilemma that Socrates presents in his conversation with Euthyphro. The use of the dilemma is successful at arguing against Euthyphro’s definition of piety. What Euthyphro defines piety is that doing what the God(s) approve of – The Devine Command Theory. As Socrates suggests the problems within horns from the dilemma, these problems again and again prove that the Devine Command Theory isn’t always right. In other words, what Euthyphro says about piety is doing what the God(s) approves of isn’t going to be true all the time.